2 and concurrence cases, can be explained as an application of estoppel doctrine, but some, such as the acquiescence cases, do not lend themselves so readily to this analysis. 4 This chapter concerns one group of cases which are governed by these rules, namely cases where the trustees perform acts which are unauthorised by the trust deed with the unanimous consent of the beneficiaries who are all sui juris and fully informed and collectively the owners of the entire beneficial interest. 5 Nowadays these conditions are not often satisfied because many trusts are drafted as discretionary settlements with wide classes of beneficiaries, including contingent beneficiaries such as future children in the case of family trusts and future spouses and dependents in the case of pension trusts. 6 However, trusts with fewer beneficiaries, all of whom had vested interests, were once much more common. Furthermore, trustees' investment powers and powers of delegation were once much more limited than they are today. Hence it often happened in the nineteenth century that trustees deliberately acted beyond the scope of their authority 'at the instigation of the beneficiaries' and that such breaches were 'the result of considered agreement' between trustees and beneficiaries who were sui juris and the owners of the whole beneficial interest. Flinders LJ 115. See also Lusina Ho's chapter in the present volume. 5 In other words, we do not discuss cases where trustees commit a breach of duty other than a duty to comply with the terms of the trust instrument, nor do we discuss cases where not all of the beneficiaries are sui juris and fully informed and in agreement. 3 however, our cases also possess the unusual feature that the trustees' unauthorised actions, when performed with the beneficiaries' consent, take effect as though they were authorised. This is noticed in the main practitioner works on trusts law. Lewin on Trusts, for example, contains a discussion of the rules shielding trustees from liability to consenting beneficiaries in Chapter 39, under the heading 'Defence of Concurrence, Acquiescence or Release and
Confirmation by a Beneficiary'; but the cases with which we are concerned then reappear in
Chapter 45, on 'Lawful Departure from the Trusts', under the heading 'By Agreement '. 8 This suggests that while estoppel reasoning (or some close variant of it) can be used to explain the trustees' escape from liability in all the 'consent' cases, a different explanation can also be given for our cases that does not work for the others. This is that the trustees'
duties are changed as a result of the beneficiaries' consenting to their unauthorised actions, with the result that the trustees commit no breach of duty although they act in a way that is not permitted by the trust deed. 
4
This is interesting from a theoretical point of view because it tells us something about the ways in which new rights and duties can be created under existing trusts. It also has practical consequences, not because it affects the outcome of claims by the beneficiaries against the trustees (since the beneficiaries will lose either way), but because it affects the position of third parties with whom the trustees have dealt and the content of the beneficiaries' rights and the trustees' duties going forward. As James Penner has written, the 'substance' of a trust subsists for as long as there are trustee duties, and their character determines the nature of the trust whether or not the trustee incurs any liability for breaching them; furthermore, 'dealings with trust property in compliance with the terms of the trust are the justification in law for those transactions being valid for the parties involved'.
10
It follows that the rules laid down in our cases merit consideration for two different reasons: first, because they can be understood to shield the trustees from liability for breach of trust in an unusual way, and, secondly, because they enable the trustees and beneficiaries to create new rights and duties under the trust. To analyse the first of these effects, one could adopt the method used by James Goudkamp in his study of tort defences, and ask whether the rule shielding the trustees from liability is a 'denial' that all the elements of a claim are present or a 'defence' which concedes that these elements are present but identifies another reason why there is no liability. 
5
or an order for substitutive performance by money payment, or owe a duty not to dispose of the property in an unauthorised way, breach of which triggers a secondary duty to pay compensation.
12
Whichever of these explanations of the trustees' liability is correct, it seems most likely that in our cases (but not in the more general run of cases) the beneficiaries' consent would enable the trustees not to invoke a 'defence' but rather to deny that they owed the relevant duty in the first place. Interesting as it would be to work through the details of this argument, however, our purpose in this chapter is to discuss the second effect, and to consider the rules which produce it alongside other rules which determine when settlors, trustees, beneficiaries and other parties can validly create new rights and duties under existing trusts. We examine these other rules in Sections 2-4, before returning to our rules in Sections 5-6.
EXERCISE OF POWERS CONFERRED BY THE SETTLOR
We start by observing that when an express trust is first created the settlor may reserve powers to himself, or grant powers to others, the exercise of which at some later date will create new rights and duties under the trust. Modern settlors often seek to achieve flexibility accompanied by ongoing control over the exercise of dispositive and administrative discretions by the trustees. The devices used by trust drafters to achieve these objectives 7 liability to make up the shortfall. 18 Where the person upon whose consent the valid exercise of a power is predicated cannot give his consent it may be that the power can never be exercised; but although the court has no general power to dispense with consents required by a trust deed or statute, 19 it may do so where this is permitted by statute, 20 or even in exceptional cases when acting under its inherent jurisdiction -as it might do, for example, where the person whose consent is required cannot give it owing to a disability. 21 The decision whether to exercise a power of veto may also be taken by the court in the place of a fiduciary power-holder who is prevented from exercising the power by an inescapable conflict of interest.
22
The creation of new rights and duties under a trust by the exercise of a power is not only sourced in the power-holder's intention to produce this effect: it is also sourced in the settlor's intention that the power-holder should be able to do this. Like the rules which determine whether a settlor has intended to create rights and duties under an express trust, 23 the rules which determine whether a settlor has intended to create powers require this question to be tested objectively: the question is whether a reasonable person would consider this to be the meaning of the settlor's words, or to follow from the settlor's words by 18 A person to whom any power, whether coupled with an interest or not, is given may by deed disclaim the power, and, after disclaimer, shall not be capable of exercising or joining in the exercise of the power.
If a settlor purports to confer a power on several people whom he intends to be the trustees of a settlement, and one disclaims the office while the others accept it, the power never vests in the 'disclaiming trustee', but as a general rule the power vests in the others who may then exercise it. 26 arise only if a power is exercised by a particular person, then these rights and duties may never come into existence if that person is unable to act or declines to do so.
The question whether a power-holder may exercise the power in a self-interested way depends on whether it is held in a personal or fiduciary capacity. This in turn depends on the settlor's intention, discoverable by examination of his words and the context in which they were expressed. If the settlor intended that the power-holder should be able to exercise the power to benefit himself then he can do that; 27 if the settlor intended that the power-holder should exercise it exclusively in the interests of the beneficiaries then he cannot validly exercise it in his own interest where this differs from the beneficiaries' interest.
28
The rules governing the question whether a power may be released also turn on the question whether the power is held in a fiduciary capacity. This is so despite the wide wording of the Law of Property Act 1925, s 155, which states that:
A person to whom any power, whether coupled with an interest or not, is given may by deed release, or contract not to exercise, the power.
This rule holds good where the power has been given to a power-holder in a personal capacity: consistently with the rule which says that such a power-holder need not even consider whether to exercise the power, 29 he is free to release the power if he wishes and the effect of doing so is to destroy the power. 30 However, where the power has been given to him in a fiduciary capacity, the power-holder must consider whether to exercise it from time to time, 31 and so he cannot release it unless release is authorised by the terms of the trust.
32
In Re Wills' Trust Deeds Buckley J distinguished cases where the settlor confers a power to benefit the power-holder, who can therefore exercise it as he chooses, or not at all, from cases where the settlor means to constitute the power-holder as his 'mandatory'
(meaning his agent), where the power-holder is subject to constraints. In the latter case, if: 33 the power is granted as a means of achieving an end which the settlor desires but which involves making a selection or decision which at the time of the creation of the trust the settlor feels unable to make, or of a kind which the settlor considers the donee to be better qualified to make than he himself is, then the proper inference may be that the settlor confers the power on the donee because he reposes a confidence in him to perform vicariously on his, the settlor's, behalf a function which the settlor would himself perform were it not that the circumstances are, or may turn out to be, such that he is bound to entrust its performance to someone else, or that they are such that he chooses to entrust it to the donee because of his peculiar qualifications to perform it. Where the trust instrument contains a provision allowing variation by a particular process, the situation is one in which the settlor, in declaring the trust and defining its terms, has specified that those terms are not immutable and that the original terms will be superseded by varied terms if the specified process of variation (entailing, in concept, a power of appointment or a power of revocation or both) is undertaken. The varied terms are in that way traceable to the settlor's intention as communicated to the original trustee.
ACTIONS BY THE SETTLOR 12
Once a trust is up and running the settlor has no power to create new rights and duties under it unless he expressly reserved such a power to himself at the time when the trust was created.
As Cory J held in the Supreme Court of Canada, in Air Products Canada v Schmidt:
35
The settlor of a trust can reserve any power to itself that it wishes provided the reservation is made at the time the trust is created. A settlor may choose to maintain the right to appoint trustees, to change the beneficiaries of the trust, or to withdraw the trust property. Generally, however, the transfer of the trust property to the trustee is absolute. Any power of control of that property will be lost unless the transfer is expressly made subject to it.
If a settlor has no reserved powers and he directs trustees to exercise a discretionary power in a certain way and they act in accordance with his instructions without using their own independent judgment, their acts can be set aside. 36 If a settlor has no reserved powers and he directs trustees to apply the trust property in a manner that is not authorised by the trust deed, and they obey his instructions, one of two possible conclusions may be drawn.
Either the trustees commit a breach of trust, or the trust deed is a sham, and does not accurately record the arrangement which the settlor and trustee made at the outset regarding the property. 35 [1994] 2 SCR 611, 643.
36 Turner v Turner [1984] Ch 100.
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The settlor and the trustee must have had a common intention to deceive before the sham doctrine will apply. As Rimer J held in in Shalson v Russo:
37
When a settlor creates a settlement he purports to divest himself of assets in favour of the trustee, and the trustee accepts them on the basis of the trusts of the settlement.
The settlor may have an unspoken intention that the assets are in fact to be treated as his own and that the trustee will accede to his every request on demand. But unless that intention is from the outset shared by the trustee (or later becomes so shared), I fail to see how the settlement can be regarded as a sham.
Where the settlor and trustee share a common intention to deceive, the rights and duties specified in the trust deed never come into existence and instead the property is held from the outset in accordance with some other arrangement agreed by the settlor and trustee. 14 Once a trust has been created it cannot be revoked by the settlor, even with the trustee's agreement, unless the settlor has a reserved power of revocation. 40 Unless the settlor is a beneficiary of the trust he has no standing to enforce its terms against the trustee, 41 and a fortiori he cannot validly direct the trustee to commit an act that is unauthorised by the terms of the trust deed.
It follows that the true position in relation to shams is as Munby J stated in A v A:
42
[As] a matter of principle a trust which is not initially a sham cannot subsequently become a sham. … Once a trust has been properly constituted, typically by the vesting of the trust property in the trustee(s) and by the execution of the deed setting out the trusts upon which the trust property is to be held by the trustee(s), the property cannot lose its character as trust property save in accordance with the terms of the trust itself, for example, by being paid to or applied for the benefit of a beneficiary in accordance with the terms of the trust deed. Any other application of the trust property is simply and necessarily a breach of trust; nothing less and nothing more. subsequently would be if all the beneficiaries were, with the requisite intention, to join together for that purpose with the trustees'. However, this would not only require that the trustees and beneficiaries must have agreed that the terms of the trust should be changed (as discussed in Section 6 below), but also that they must have agreed to conceal this change from others.
A trustee who has bona fide accepted office as such cannot divest himself of his fiduciary obligations by his own improper acts. If therefore, a trustee who has entered into his responsibilities, and without having any intention of being party to a sham, subsequently purports, perhaps in agreement with the settlor, to treat the trust as a sham, the effect is not to create a sham where previously there was a valid trust.
The only effect, even if the agreement is actually carried into execution, is to expose the trustee to a claim for breach of trust and, it may well be, to expose the settlor to a claim for knowing assistance in that breach of trust.
The same points were also made by Barrett JA in Re Dion Investments Pty Ltd:
43
Where an express trust is established … by a deed made between a settlor and the initial trustee to which the settled property is transferred, rights of the beneficiaries arise immediately the deed takes effect. The beneficiaries are not parties to the deed and, to the extent that it embodies covenants given by its parties to one another, the beneficiaries are strangers to those covenants and cannot sue at law for breach of them. The beneficiaries' rights are equitable rights arising from the circumstance that the trustee has accepted the office of trustee and, therefore, the duties and obligations with respect to the trust property (and otherwise) that that office carries with it.
Any subsequent action of the settlor and the original trustee to vary the provisions of the deed made by them will not be effective to affect either the rights and interests of the beneficiaries or the duties, obligations and powers of the trustee.
Those two parties have no ability to deprive the beneficiaries of those rights and interests or to vary either the terms of the trust that the trustee is bound to execute and
uphold or the powers that are available to the trustee in order to do so. The terms of the trust have, in the eyes of equity, an existence that is independent of the provisions of the deed that define them.
Let it be assumed that on Monday the settlor and the trustee execute and deliver the trust deed (at which point the settled sum changes hands) and that on Tuesday they execute a deed revoking the original deed and stating that their rights and obligations are as if it had never existed. Unless some power of revocation of the trusts has been reserved, the subsequent action does not change the fact that the trustee holds the settled sum for the benefit of beneficiaries named in the original deed and upon the trusts stated in that deed. The … equitable rights and interests of a beneficiary cannot be taken away or varied by anyone unless the terms of the trust itself (or statute) so allow.
ACTIONS BY THE TRUSTEES
As the foregoing passages of Munby J's and Barrett JA's judgments indicate, trustees are prima facie in the same position as the settlor once the trust is up and running: they cannot unilaterally create new rights and duties under the trust unless the settlor gave them a power to do this at the time when the trust was created. They are bound to observe the limits on their authority, 44 and in particular they may not enter unauthorised transactions affecting the trust property or make unauthorised appointments of the trust property. everything turns on the facts. 50 The third and safest course for the trustees would therefore be to make an application for prior approval from the court under the Trustee Act 1925, s 57.
51
This section applies where trustees lack the power under the trust deed and the general law to enter transactions in the course of managing and administering the trust property which the court accepts to be expedient, and it authorises the court to make an order conferring the necessary power on the trustees, either generally or in a particular instance.
52
Where trustees successfully take one of these three routes to perform unauthorised acts without incurring liability, the question arises whether the exemption clause or the court order changes the duties that the trustees would otherwise owe, or merely exempts them from liability for breach of their duties? So far as exemption clauses are concerned, the answer depends on their wording. Many clauses exclude liability for breach of trustee duties without changing the content of the duties, but clauses can also be drafted to achieve the latter effect. of a testator's American will on terms that it 'shall have no responsibility or duty with respect to' a Hong Kong house until the deaths of the testator's elderly brother and sister who resided in the house. This house was given by a Hong Kong will to another executor on trust for
An example is provided by
Citibank as executor of the American will. Citibank declined to take steps to have the house sold for the benefit of the beneficiaries under the American will who wanted the house to be sold and the siblings to be evicted from it. Substantial losses flowed from the delayed sale of the house, but the Privy Council held that the clause enabled Citibank to permit the siblings to remain living in the house without incurring any liability for losses because it owed no duties regarding the house (other than a duty not to use it for Citibank's own purposes).
The wording of the Trustee Act 1925, s 61 makes it clear that the section authorises the court to excuse a trustee from liability for breach of trust but does not negate the trustee's duty. 54 It follows that court orders relieving trustees from liability under the section do not change the content of the trustees' duties and the beneficiaries' corresponding rights against them. In contrast, the Trustee Act 1925, s 57 authorises the court to change the scope and content of the trustees' powers and hence of the trustees' duties and the beneficiaries' rights.
In Chapman v Chapman, 55 the House of Lords held that the object of the section is to make it possible for trust property to be managed as advantageously as possible for the beneficiaries, but that it does not empower the court to alter the beneficial interests under trusts -a finding which led to the enactment of the Variation of Trusts Act 1958 because Parliament considered that the courts should be able to sanction such alterations in cases where the beneficiaries could not do it for themselves because they were not all sui juris and owners of the entire beneficial interest. 56 However the courts have also held that the partitioning and 54 
MCP Pension Trustees Ltd v AON Pension Trustees Ltd

22
The role of the court is not to stand in as, or for, a settlor in varying the trusts.
[Rather] … the court acts "on behalf of" the specified class and, in appropriate cases, supplies consent for persons incapable of consenting.
The 
23
The fact that creating new rights and duties under an existing trust would be contrary to the settlor's wishes does not suffice to justify a rule forbidding beneficiaries to do this, given that termination of the trust is permitted although this would run counter to the settlor's wishes.
However, the courts have held that the wishes of the trustees must also be taken into account:
the trustees only agree to take office on the basis that they will have a particular set of discretionary powers and duties owed to a particular set of beneficiaries, and so it would be unfair to them if the beneficiaries could rewrite the terms of the 'deal' which the trustees made with the settlor, regardless of whether the trustees themselves agreed to this. This was also brought out by Walton J in Stephenson, where he said that:
65
[O]nce the beneficial interest holders have determined to end the trust they are not entitled, unless by agreement, to the further services of the trustees. Those trustees can of course be compelled to hand over the entire trust assets to any person or persons selected by the beneficiaries against a proper discharge, but they cannot be compelled, unless they are in fact willing to comply with the directions, to do anything else with the trust fund which they are not in fact willing to do.
This suggests that the difference of opinion described in the previous section can be resolved if we distinguish between acts done by beneficiaries acting unilaterally without the trustees' agreement and acts done by beneficiaries with the trustees' agreement. The rule in 24 the trusts and they do not need the trustees to agree to this because the trustees will have no further duties to perform once the trust has been ended. 66 However, the rule does not entitle the beneficiaries to require the trustees to keep the trust going on different terms, or to serve as the trustees of a new trust declared by the beneficiaries, 67 because although it empowers the beneficiaries to override the wishes of the settlor it does not empower them to force new duties onto the trustees which the trustees do not wish to perform and did not agree to perform when they took office.
This understanding of the law is supported by judicial statements which envisage that the beneficiaries can change the terms of existing trusts, or declare new trusts which will be operated by their existing trustees, provided that the trustees consent to this arrangement.
This principle is sometimes said to be grounded in the rule in Saunders v Vautier, but it would be more accurate to say that it is an extension of the rule, which depends on the trustees' consent as well as the beneficiaries' consent to the new arrangement. The agreement of the trustee will always be required in cases where the original trusts continue, to avoid the trustees being burdened by obligations to which they may not have agreed.
In this respect the position of the beneficiaries is analogous to the position of a settlor who wishes to create an express trust for the first time. A settlor can express the wish that certain parties should act as the trustees and hold the trust property subject to certain duties, and if the nominated parties agree these duties will become enforceable and the beneficiaries will have corresponding rights against them in their capacity as trustees of the settlement.
However, the nominated parties can refuse to accept these duties: they can disclaim and the settlor or court must then find other people who are willing to accept the trusteeship. In just the same way, the beneficiaries of an existing trust can express the wish that the trustees should become subject to new duties, either under a varied trust or under a new settlement, and if the trustees agree then new rights and duties will be created. another person with the intention that his equitable interest shall thereby be extinguished. This finding should also logically extend to a case where the recipient of the legal title has previously agreed to hold it on a new trust. However, these were effectively the facts of Grey (n 71), which held that such an arrangement is caught by s 53(1)(c), although it is hard to see this because in Grey the trustees effectively 'conveyed' legal title from themselves in their capacity as trustees for the settlor to themselves in their different capacity as trustees of other pre-existing settlements for the settlor's grandchildren. This is well explained in B Green, 'Grey, Oughtred and dealings are essentially no different from cases where they consent to these dealings beforehand. In either case, the trustees' motives for entering the relevant transaction do not matter, in the sense that it makes no difference whether they deal with the trust property with the subjective intention of acting for the beneficiaries, for themselves, or for someone else.
All that matters is that the trustees have in fact sold the trust property or invested trust money in a transaction which is unauthorised by the trust deed but which the beneficiaries choose to adopt. This suggests that it may not be quite right to say that the sale proceeds or newly acquired investment become part of the trust fund because the beneficiaries and trustees have agreed that this should happen. In some cases there is no real agreement, and although the courts could deem an agreement to have taken place (for example, by refusing to let the trustees say that they acted with a contrary motive), there is no need for the courts to explain the cases in this way, since there is no need for an agreement at all: the beneficiaries and trustees need only to have 'acted together' in the sense that the trustees have in fact done something and the beneficiaries have consented to it.
In cases where beneficiaries adopt unauthorised sales or investments by trustees, some thought must also be given to the position of the third parties with whom the trustees have dealt. Unauthorised sales of trust property are not generally capable of overreaching the beneficiaries' equitable interests in the property because overreaching only occurs as a result of the trustees' exercise of their powers under the trust deed to subordinate the beneficiaries'
interests to those of a purchaser. 75 Suppose, however, that a trustee sells trust property to a Estate that the beneficiaries' ability to treat the proceeds of an unauthorised sale as trust property is the same as for an authorised sale. 77 Since the beneficiaries' ability to do this is the corollary of the overreaching doctrine, it follows that the purchaser's position is also the same in both cases. Jessel MR's words were as follows:
31
'Defences in Equity'. One point of our study, however, has been to show that legal rules can produce more than one effect, and that their significance for litigants may depend on the context in which they are invoked. It may suit trustees to defend a claim for breach of trust by arguing that they never committed a breach of duty because the effect of the beneficiaries' unanimous consent to their actions was to change the content of the duties which the trustees owed. Or it may suit beneficiaries to say that they acquired new rights against trustees when they agreed with the trustees that the trust property should be held on different terms, or when they adopted the trustees' unauthorised dealings with the trust property.
A wider point which emerges from our chapter is that rights and duties under express trusts are not only sourced in the intentions of settlors that they should come into existence.
Settlors can only realise their intentions with the cooperation of other parties, such as their intended trustees and beneficiaries who must choose to accept (and not to disclaim) their duties and rights, and such as the intended donees of powers who must choose to exercise their powers, as discussed in this chapter in Section 2. The intentions of settlors can also be overridden, and new rights and duties can be created which the settlor may not have contemplated and may not have wished to be brought into existence. As discussed in Sections 4 and 5, trustees and beneficiaries have limited ability to achieve such effects if they act unilaterally, but as discussed in Section 6, they have more power if they act together.
